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NOTES 
 
THE VIRTUES OF ABSTENTION: 
SEPARATION OF POWERS IN 
AL-NASHIRI II 
NICHOLAS A. DIMARCO† 
INTRODUCTION 
Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed al-Nashiri was a high 
level al Qaida operative, active off the Yemeni coast at the turn of 
the twentieth century.  He targeted U.S. Navy vessels operating 
in the Port of Aden, including the USS Cole in an act of treachery 
that killed seventeen members of the ship’s crew in October 
2000.1  Arrested by local authorities in Dubai a year later, al-
Nashiri was transferred into U.S. custody and detained at a CIA 
black site.2  Five years after his removal to Guantánamo Bay, 
Cuba in 2006, the Obama administration convened a military 
 
† Editor-in-Chief, St. John’s Law Review & Journal of Catholic Legal Studies; 
J.D. Candidate, 2018, St. John’s University School of Law. The Author extends 
thanks to his family for their support, to his professors, especially Professor Jane 
Scott, for their mentorship, and to Him who gives joy to my youth. Psalm 43:3 (New 
American). 
1 Brief for the United States on Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the Military 
Commission at 8–11, In re Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 30, 2016) (Nos. 
15-1023, 15-5020), 2015 WL 9473946, at *8–10 [hereinafter Government’s Brief]. For 
a collection of government documents related to al-Nashiri’s detention and the 
charges filed against him, see The Guantánamo Docket: Abd al Rahim al Nashiri, 
N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/10015-abd-al-rahim-
al-nashiri (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). 
2 In re Al-Nashiri (Al-Nashiri II), 835 F.3d 110, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Tatel, J., 
dissenting) reh'g denied, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 354 (2017). The black sites were 
secretive interrogation cells operated by the CIA in various countries, such as 
Poland. For a charged, at times chilling, report on the program, see generally 
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 113TH CONG., COMM. STUDY OF THE 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM 
(Comm. Print 2014). 
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commission to try al-Nashiri on charges related to his attack on 
the USS Cole and other vessels.3  The President did so under the 
2009 Military Commissions Act (“2009 MCA”), the final product 
of an extended dialogue among the President, Congress, and the 
Supreme Court about the shape these commissions would take. 
In the most recent round of litigation to reach a federal 
court,4 counsel for al-Nashiri filed a habeas petition in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia that collaterally 
attacked the commission convened to try him.5  Seeking a 
preliminary injunction that would bring commission proceedings 
to a halt until resolution of his habeas petition, al-Nashiri argued 
that the commission lacked jurisdiction to try him for his crimes 
because they were not committed in the context of hostilities.6  
Chief Judge Richard W. Roberts denied the injunction and 
declined to exercise equitable jurisdiction over the habeas 
petition during the pendency of the military commission trial.7 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia took a deferential posture to al-Nashiri’s 
habeas petition.  In a split decision, the panel applied 
Councilman abstention doctrine to the military commissions 
convened under the MCA, clearing the way for al-Nashiri’s oft-
delayed trial.8  The decision to abstain, while consistent with 
 
3 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 113. Al-Nashiri also funded and directed the 
attempted attack on the USS The Sullivans in January 2000, and the successful 
bombing of the MV Limburg, a French supertanker, in October 2002. Id. at 113–14. 
4 On a separate issue, al-Nashiri sought a writ of mandamus from the District 
Court for the District of Columbia in late 2014 to challenge the constitutionality of 
the appointment of two military judges on his Court of Military Commission Review 
(“CMCR”) appellate panel. In re Al-Nashiri (Al-Nashiri I), 791 F.3d 71, 75 (D.C. Cir. 
2015). The District Court denied the petition because al-Nashiri had not shown that 
he was clearly and indisputably entitled to mandamus relief. Id. at 85–86. In any 
event, the court reasoned that the President and Senate could “put to rest any 
Appointments Clause questions regarding the CMCR’s military judges” by 
nominating and confirming them. Id. at 86. The President and Senate did just that 
in April 2016. 
5 Al-Nashiri v. Obama, 76 F. Supp. 3d 218, 221 (D.D.C. 2014). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 223. 
8 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 118; see also Peter Margulies, DC Circuit in Al-
Nashiri: All Clear for Military Commission Trial, LAWFARE (Aug. 31, 2016, 9:30 
AM), https://lawfareblog.com/dc-circuit-al-nashiri-all-clear-military-commission-trial 
(approving the result). For an expert discussion of the decision, listen to The Lawfare 
Podcast: Geeking Out on Al-Nashiri with Michel Paradis and Bob Loeb, LAWFARE 
(Sept. 3, 2016), https://lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-geeking-out-al-nashiri-
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recent decisions by lower federal courts, contrasts markedly with 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,9 decided ten years earlier.  There, the 
United States Supreme Court showed little deference to the 
executive, declined to take the path of abstention and instead 
issued a wide-ranging opinion that validated the military 
commission mechanism but invalidated the system as employed 
by the Bush administration.  Why does Councilman abstention 
apply now but not before?  What was missing in 2006, when 
Hamdan was decided, that has since led federal courts to defer to 
the military commissions?  And is judicial deference—in 
particular abstention—the appropriate response to the military 
commission system currently in place at Guantánamo? 
This Note investigates those questions.  Part I examines 
various scholarly approaches to judicial deference, then considers 
deference in the context of military commissions.  In Part II, the 
history of military commissions in the United States is examined, 
paying particular attention to the extended dialogue among the 
coordinate federal branches that created the system currently in 
operation.  The decision in Al-Nashiri II10 not to adjudicate a 
collateral attack on one of these commissions is the focus of Part 
III.  That Part embraces the underlying jurisdictional challenge 
at stake in Al-Nashiri II, the development of abstention doctrine 
generally and as applied to the current commissions, as well as 
the role judicial deference played in the panel’s decision.  Finally, 
in Part IV, this Note argues that the path of abstention had 
many virtues in this case and as a rule of law, because it 
furthered sound separation of powers principles by respecting the 
considered judgments of Congress and successive Presidents. 
Part IV first categorizes the type of deference the panel engaged 
in by abstaining.  Next, it considers the effect the decision will 
have on future collateral attacks on commission proceedings, as 
federal courts will now review military commission final 
judgments, just as Congress and the President intended, rather 
than intervening indiscriminately.  This Note argues that this 
 
michel-paradis-and-bob-loeb. For a discussion of abstention doctrine, see infra Part 
III.B. 
9 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
10 This Note follows the majority of commentators in referring to the most 
recent D.C. Circuit decision as Al-Nashiri II. See, e.g., Stephen Vladeck, Al-Nashiri 
II: Comity, Legitimacy, and the Military Commissions, LAWFARE (Aug. 31, 2016, 
12:20 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/al-nashiri-ii-comity-legitimacy-and-military 
-commissions. 
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effect will, in turn, preserve the commission system created by 
Congress—the branch best suited to weigh the intricate national 
security considerations involved in prosecuting and bringing to 
justice those who, in their attempt to thwart our military effort, 
violate the laws of war. 
I. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Although chronicling every instance of judicial deference is 
beyond the scope of this Note, a brief review will bring into 
greater focus what is meant by the term here.11  Because 
characterizing a judicial decision as “deferential” often involves a 
value judgment, scholars have developed a variety of approaches 
to defining deference.  In the national security context, however, 
judicial deference implicates separation of powers principles and 
the balance to be reached among the coordinate branches when it 
comes to decisions about the nation’s defense and security. 
Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes say that 
balance historically has been achieved through a process-based 
approach that courts employ in extreme security contexts.12  This 
approach shifts responsibility to Congress and the President, the 
most democratic branches of government.13  The judiciary’s 
willingness to limit its role in national security decision making 
when there is bilateral institutional action aligns with Justice 
Robert H. Jackson’s categorization of presidential power in the 
The Steel Seizure Case,14 which is widely accepted as the guide to 
modern analysis of separation of powers.15  The historical pattern 
 
11 Instances where federal courts defer to the political branches are sundry, but 
this Note focuses on the deference in the national security context, leaving aside 
Chevron deference, for example. For a discussion of the application of Chevron 
deference to foreign affairs, see Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign 
Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649 (2000); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 
2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 60–66 (canvassing decisions in which courts deferred to the 
executive on national security issues). 
12 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and 
Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During 
Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 1, 5 (2004). Professors Issacharoff and 
Pildes distinguish this process-based approach from “civil libertarianism” on the one 
end, and “executive unilateralism” on the other. 
13 Id. 
14 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 
579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
15 See Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying 
the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1274 (2003) (referencing Justice 
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Professors Issacharoff and Pildes discern can be summarized as 
follows: “Where both legislature and executive endorse a 
particular tradeoff between liberty and security, the courts have 
accepted that judgment,” that is, deferred.16  On the other hand, 
“Where the executive has acted in the face of legislation policies 
or without legislative approval, the courts have invalidated 
executive action, even during wartime, or scrutinized it more 
closely.”17 
Professor John Yoo takes issue with the latter part of this 
pattern.18  Professor Yoo has provided a formal and functional 
case for judicial deference to executive interpretations of foreign 
affairs laws, described by scholars as the “executive unilateral 
approach.”19  Recognizing the well-settled doctrine requiring 
deference to reasonable executive interpretations of ambiguous 
statutes,20 he has argued courts should be all the more willing to 
defer to executive action where the president’s constitutional 
powers as the Commander-in-Chief are implicated.21  In addition, 
he points out that courts have historically deferred to reasonable 
executive interpretations of treaties and customary international 
law.22  But the more fundamental rationale for judicial deference 
to the executive in this context is functional, not doctrinal.  From 
an institutional standpoint, courts lack the information-
gathering capabilities that place the executive—with its own 
“institutional experts and a wide global network of contacts” 
uncontrolled by rules of evidence and discovery—in the superior 
position to achieve national goals in international relations.23  
 
Jackson’s “three now-canonical categories that guide modern analysis of separation 
of powers”). 
16 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 12, at 44. 
17 Id. 
18 Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign 
Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 180 (2006). 
19 Id. At least in the context of military commissions, Professor Yoo argues that 
scholars have failed to articulate why congressional sanction of the commissions is a 
necessary precondition for the executive to employ them. Id. at 212–13. Even the 
Court in Hamdan declined to reach the constitutional question of whether the 
president could convene a military commission without congressional approval in 
cases of “controlling necessity.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 592 (2006). 
Because Congress has expressly authorized the military commissions at 
Guantánamo, the question is largely academic and will not be discussed in this Note. 
20 Ku & Yoo, supra note 18, at 195 (discussing Chevron deference). 
21 Id. at 195–96. 
22 Id. at 196–99. 
23 Id. at 199–201. 
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Moreover, the executive is politically accountable to the body 
politic, which has the power to eventually change undesirable 
interpretations and strategies.24  None of this is to say that courts 
should abdicate their responsibilities in the face of executive 
branch assertions, but the case for judicial caution where the 
“[e]xecutive’s competence is maximal” and the judiciary’s is 
“virtually nonexistent” is worth considering, especially when the 
nation’s safety is at stake.25 
Another approach, articulated by Professor Cass Sunstein, 
advises that the judiciary proceed “cautiously and narrowly when 
national security is at risk.”26  The characteristics of this 
“minimalist alternative”27 are to (1) require that Congress 
authorize any executive branch interference with constitutionally 
protected interests, (2) ensure any deprivations of liberty are 
accompanied by minimally fair procedures, and (3) issue narrow 
and incompletely theorized decisions.28  The minimalist approach 
to conflicts between civil liberty and national security has been 
endorsed in prominent wartime decisions29 and has the 
advantage of ensuring that the federal judiciary plays a role that 
is best-suited to its institutional strengths and weaknesses.30 
Finally, Professor David Rudenstine believes that since the 
end of World War II, the Supreme Court has employed various 
legal doctrines to insulate executive action from meaningful 
judicial review in cases the executive asserts implicate national 
security.31  These doctrines include the state secrets privilege, 
standing requirements, the quasi-immunity defense, as well as 
 
24 Id. at 201. 
25 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 677 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
26 Sunstein, supra note 11, at 77. 
27 Professor Sunstein places minimalism in contradistinction to two other 
competing approaches: national security maximalism and liberty maximalism. 
National security maximalists believe the Constitution requires a highly deferential 
role for the judiciary when the nation’s security is threatened. Id. at 49–50. 
Conversely, liberty maximalists “insist that in times of war, at least as much as in 
times of peace, federal judges must protect constitutional liberty.” Id. On this 
spectrum, judicial minimalism lies somewhere in the middle. 
28 Id. at 77. 
29 Professor Sunstein argues the following cases illustrate his minimalist 
approach to decision making during war time: Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); 
The Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); and Ex parte Endo, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 79–83. 
30 Sunstein, supra note 11, at 109. 
31 DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE AGE OF DEFERENCE: THE SUPREME COURT, 
NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 3–4 (2016). 
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heightened pleading rules.  All of these, Rudenstine argues, 
combine to deny judicial relief to individuals whose rights may 
have been violated, immunize controversial executive conduct 
from judicial review, and permit excess secrecy in judicial 
proceedings.32  According to Rudenstine, this “age of deference” 
has diminished transparency and undermined the nation’s 
commitment to rule of law and checks and balances.33 
Professor Rudenstine is careful to note that judicial 
deference is not a reaction to the attacks on September 11, 2001, 
and the cases he describes span the twentieth century.  That 
said, in the aftermath of September 11, judges have deferred to 
executive designations of foreign organizations as terrorist 
organizations,34 limited Freedom of Information Act requests 
when they have implicated national security concerns,35 and 
respected joint executive-legislative fact-findings when 
interpreting the statute prohibiting material support for 
terrorists.36  This hardly seems surprising, as these issues would 
appear to involve precisely the type of national security decisions 
that federal judges would leave to the political branches.37  
 
32 Id. at 4. 
33 Id. at 7, 9. 
34 People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 
103, 111 (1948)) (holding the question of whether the terrorist activity of the 
organization threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the national security of the 
United States a nonjusticiable question because questions concerning the foreign 
policy decisions of the executive branch present political judgments, “decisions of a 
kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and 
have long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial 
intrusion or inquiry”) (internal citations omitted). 
35 Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 932 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (“[I]n undertaking a deferential review we simply recognize the different roles 
underlying the constitutional separation of powers. It is within the role of the 
executive to acquire and exercise the expertise of protecting national security. It is 
not within the role of the courts to second-guess executive judgments made in 
furtherance of that branch's proper role.”); see also ACLU v. Dep’t of Justice, 321 F. 
Supp. 2d 24, 35 (D.D.C. 2004) (deferring to government judgment that requested 
information should be exempted from Freedom of Information Act request). 
36 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33–34 (2010) (“That 
evaluation of the facts by the Executive, like Congress's assessment, is entitled to 
deference. This litigation implicates sensitive and weighty interests of national 
security and foreign affairs.”). 
37 LAWRENCE J. MORRIS, MILITARY JUSTICE: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 176–77 
(2010) [hereinafter MILITARY JUSTICE]; Statement of Daniel J. Dell’Orto, Principal 
Deputy General Counsel Department of Defense, reprinted in 76 TERRORISM: 
DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 215 (2007). 
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Nonetheless, the only Supreme Court decision to squarely 
address the legality of the military commissions convened by the 
George W. Bush administration to try alleged terrorists was 
anything but deferential.38  To explain why, Part II of this Note 
provides a history of military commissions, focusing specifically 
on the development of the current system in operation at 
Guantánamo Bay. 
II. MILITARY COMMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
As long as there are armed conflicts, there will likely be 
military commissions in one form or another.39  This Part 
chronicles the history of military commissions in the United 
States from the Mexican-American War to the aftermath of 
September 11, 2001.  Next, it examines the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld to strike down the military 
commissions as constituted under the Bush administration.  
Finally, this Part describes Congress’s response to the Hamdan 
decision, as well as the current system of military commissions 
under the Military Commissions Act of 2009, paying specific 
attention to their composition and appellate review structure. 
A. Commissions through Early American History 
A military commission is convened as an “incident to the 
conduct of war” in order “to seize and subject to disciplinary 
measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or 
impede our military effort have violated the law of war.”40  It is 
 
38 See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
39 Gary D. Solis, Contemporary Law of War and Military Commissions, in 
GUANTÁNAMO AND BEYOND: EXCEPTIONAL COURTS AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 73, 73 (Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Oren Gross eds., 2013) 
(outlining the evolution of military commissions); see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 590 
(“The military commission . . . was born of military necessity”); Madsen v. Kinsella, 
343 U.S. 341, 346–47 (1952) (“Since our nation’s earliest days, [military] 
commissions have been constitutionally recognized agencies for meeting many 
urgent governmental responsibilities related to war.”). But see Carol L. Chomsky, 
Military Commissions in Historical Perspective: Lessons from the United States – 
Dakota War Trials, in GUANTÁNAMO AND BEYOND: EXCEPTIONAL COURTS AND 
MILITARY COMMISSIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra, at 55, 55 
(“Throughout American history, military commissions had been used irregularly and 
rarely . . . .”). 
40 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 596 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Ex parte 
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1942)). This type of commission is distinct from those 
commissions used in place of civilian courts when martial law has been declared, 
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generally accepted that General Winfield Scott convened the first 
military commissions in the United States in 1847 to maintain 
order during America’s occupation of Mexico in the little-
discussed Mexican War.41  Their use was expanded during the 
Civil War, and even “flourished.”42  Although more than 2,000 
commissions were convened during the Civil War, the two cases 
that attracted the most public attention involved northerners 
who were sympathetic to the Confederacy but did not take up 
arms against the government.43  In United States v. 
Vallandigham,44 the Court reviewed a commission convened by 
Union General Ambrose Burnside to try Clement Vallandigham, 
a former Congressman from Ohio, for expressing sympathy for 
the South.45  The Supreme Court indirectly upheld 
Vallandigham’s conviction, holding the military commissions 
 
and those in operation during a military occupation. Id. at 595–96. It is also distinct 
from courts-martial.  
41 See David Glazier, Note, Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?: Judging 
the 21st Century Military Commission, 89 VA. L. REV. 2005, 2027 (2003) (“It is 
generally agreed that the real origin of the military commission dates from the 
Mexican War of 1846–1848.”) (citing WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND 
PRECEDENTS 832–33 (2d ed. rev. 1920)); MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 179–
83; LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 32–35 (2005) [hereinafter MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS]. There were instances predating the Mexican War where military 
commissions were convened, most notably by George Washington to determine 
whether Major Andre, alleged to be a British spy, was guilty of espionage, and by 
General Andrew Jackson during the War of 1812 in New Orleans and during the 
First Seminole War. See MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 179; MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS, supra, at 27–33. 
42 See Solis, supra note 39, at 76–77. The military commissions employed by the 
Lincoln administration were not based on the General Scott’s model, but rather the 
“versatile Missouri model” crafted by Henry Halleck in the critical border state of 
Missouri to combat anti-union insurgents at the onset of the Civil War. Gideon M. 
Hart, Military Commissions and the Lieber Code: Toward a New Understanding of 
the Jurisdictional Foundations of Military Commissions, 203 MIL. L. REV. 1, 8–22 
(2010). Halleck expanded the jurisdiction of the commissions to include all of those 
offenses constituting violations of the laws of war. Id. The Department of War built 
on Halleck’s innovation and more fully delineated the laws of war in the Lieber 
Code. Id. Today’s military commissions are a descendent of the Civil War-era Lieber 
Code. See Solis, supra note 39, at 76. For a discussion of the Lieber Code and its 
imprint on military commissions in the United States and beyond, see MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS, supra note 41, at 75–80. 
43 MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 183. 
44 68 U.S. 243 (1863). 
45 MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 41, at 56. Vallandigham was an experienced 
trial lawyer, and he was given the opportunity to call witnesses, cross-examine the 
witnesses for the prosecution, had the assistance of counsel, and called a witness on 
his own behalf. Id. (citing Vallandigham, 68 U.S. at 243, 244). 
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could not be reviewed by the ordinary federal appellate courts.46  
After the Civil War had ended, however, the Supreme Court 
concluded that military commissions could not try a U.S. citizen, 
Lamdin Milligan, for domestic offenses—in that case, 
conspiracy—when the civilian state courts were open and 
operating.47 
B. Commissions during World War II 
Military commissions were not employed during World War 
I,48 but World War II “saw hundreds of commissions convened in 
both the European and Pacific theaters.”49  Again, two high-
profile Supreme Court decisions stand out: Ex parte Quirin50 and 
In re Yamashita.51  In both, the Supreme Court relied upon 
explicit congressional authorization for trials by military 
tribunals.52  Quirin involved the trial of eight German-born 
 
46 MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 184. 
47 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). The decision was unanimous, but four 
justices concurred in the opinion because they believed that commissions could be 
convened even when the ordinary courts were open, as “Congress had power, though 
not exercised, to authorize the military commission which was held in Indiana.” Id. 
at 87. The emphasis on congressional sanction is noteworthy, especially in light of 
the decisions in Hamdan and Al-Nashiri II. Notwithstanding the setback, military 
commissions continued to function in the South under martial law during 
Reconstruction. MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 41, at 59. 
48 MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 186 (discussing Attorney General 
Thomas Watt Gregory’s decision not to employ a commission to try Pable Waberski, 
a Russian national suspected of sabotage). 
49 Id. at 188. 
50 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
51 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
52 See, e.g., Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28 (“By the Articles of War, and especially 
Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, 
that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the 
law of war in appropriate cases. Congress, in addition to making rules for the 
government of our Armed Forces, has thus exercised its authority to define and 
punish offenses against the law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional 
limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons for offenses 
which, according to the rules and precepts of the law of nations, and more 
particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such tribunals.”); Yamashita, 327 U.S. 
at 12 (“The war power, from which the commission derives its existence, is not 
limited to victories in the field, but carries with it the inherent power to guard 
against the immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy, at least in ways 
Congress has recognized, the evils which the military operations have produced.”) 
(emphasis added). The proposition that military commissions require express 
congressional authorization was picked up by the Hamdan Court, which noted the 
authority to establish and use penal tribunes, such as the current military 
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saboteurs who had been captured after landing on U.S. soil with 
plans to cause destruction.53  In response to the agents’ 
infiltration, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a 
proclamation54 creating the military commission and 
supplemented it with a military order in which he appointed 
members of the tribunal, the prosecutors, and defense counsel.55  
The Supreme Court issued a short per curiam decision that 
allowed the commission to proceed, before rendering a full-
throated opinion a few months later, unanimously upholding 
President Roosevelt’s commission as valid—by then, three 
months had passed and six of the saboteurs had already been 
executed by electrocution.56 
The United States continued to employ commissions even 
after the conflict ended, most notably to try General Tomoyuki 
Yamashita, a senior leader of Japan’s Imperial Army.57  The 
Supreme Court validated the commission convened to try 
Yamashita as an appropriate mechanism and rejected the 
defense’s argument that the Geneva Conventions required 
Yamashita’s trial to proceed through a court-martial.58  
Importantly, the Court deferred to the commission’s factual 
findings, limiting its review to questions of law.59 
 
 
 
 
commissions, “can derive only from the powers granted jointly to the President and 
Congress in time of war.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006). 
53 MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 187. The German saboteurs, two of 
whom were U.S. citizens, were charged with violating the law of war, the Articles of 
War, and conspiracy. See MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 41, at 103–06 (discussing 
the charges). 
54 Proclamation 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 7, 1942). 
55 MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 41, at 99 (citing 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 7, 
1942)). 
56 Id. at 114. The Court’s central holding in Quirin is that “lawful combatants” 
and “unlawful combatants” are “subject to capture and detention” for the duration of 
hostilities, but “unlawful combatants” are also “subject to trial and punishment by 
military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful”; in this 
instance, for espionage, which is a violation of the laws of war. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 
31. The Court also distinguished the case of the Nazi saboteurs from that of Lamdin 
Milligan who, unlike the saboteurs, had never joined the Confederates and therefore 
was not a part of a conventional military. Id. at 45. 
57 MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 188. 
58 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 24 (1946). 
59 Id. at 8; MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 41, at 147. 
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The end of World War II brought about the Nuremberg 
Trials and immense changes in the international community’s 
approach to the law of armed conflict.60  These developments 
implicated the lawful use of military commissions, but because 
the United States did not employ military commissions during 
the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, these implications were not 
brought to bear until the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.61 
C. Military Commissions During the Bush Administration 
On September 11, 2001, agents of the al Qaida terrorist 
group hijacked commercial airplanes and attacked the World 
Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Arlington, 
Virginia.62  So began the longest war in American history.63  In 
response to these tragic attacks, Congress passed the 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), which 
authorized the President to “use all necessary and appropriate 
force” against those “nations, organizations, or persons” that 
 
60 See Solis, supra note 39, at 81 (“The most significant innovation was the 1949 
Geneva Conventions.”). To be certain, the Nuremberg Trials were not military 
commissions. They were convened by an international coalition—rather than by the 
United States under its own sovereign authority—for the specific purpose of 
bringing to justice Nazi leaders. MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 189. 
61 Solis, supra note 39, at 84. 
62 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567–68 (2006). A fourth hijacked plane 
crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. 
63 Jack Goldsmith & Matthew C. Waxman, The Other Forever War, TIME (Sept. 
10, 2016), http://time.com/4486572/forever-war-islamic-state-isis/; Edmonds v. Dep’t 
of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 82 n.7 (2004) (“[T]he imminent threat of terrorism 
will not be eliminated anytime in the foreseeable future, but is an endeavor that will 
consume our nation’s attention indefinitely.”). Perhaps the dreadful prospect of 
perpetual warfare is best expressed poetically:  
What? War 
as a living text? Cyberwar and permanent 
war, Third Wave War, neocortical war, 
Sixth Generation War, Fourth Epoch 
War, pure war and war of computers 
to process it, systems 
to represent it, war of myth 
and metaphor, of trope and assent, 
war of hundreds of millions of televisions 
assuring it, hundreds of billions 
of dollars, a PK machine gun or two, a few 
gunmen you can hire cheap, with their own 
Kalashnikovs. Now . . . What now? 
Lawrence Joseph, Rubaiyat, FSG WORK IN PROGRESS, http://www.fsgworkinprogress 
.com/2015/04/rubaiyat/. 
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orchestrated the September 11 attacks.64  In addition, the AUMF 
served as the basis for the government’s counterterrorism 
detention authority.65  Pursuant to the AUMF, President Bush 
issued a Military Order66 authorizing the military to detain 
“member[s] of the organization known as al Qaida” and those 
who assisted or harbored them.67 
Pursuant to President Bush’s order, Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld promulgated rules and procedures for the commissions.  
Defendants in these commissions received the following 
protections: 
 “The right to military defense counsel upon being charged 
with a listed offense”; 
 “The right to civilian counsel of choice,” to be paid for by 
the defendant; 
 “The privilege against self-incrimination at trial”;68 
 
64 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The AUMF provides in full: 
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United 
States by such nations, organizations or persons. 
65 See Adam R. Pearlman, Meaningful Review and Process Due: How 
Guantanamo Detention Is Changing the Battlefield, 6 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 255, 
270 (2015); see also Obaydullah v. Obama, 688 F.3d 784, 791 (2012) (“As this court 
has now repeatedly held, the AUMF gives the United States government the 
authority to detain a person who is found to have been part of al Qaeda or Taliban 
forces . . . and Congress has since affirmed that authority.”) (internal citations 
omitted) (quoting Al Alwi v. Obama 653 F.3d 11, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). The Obama 
administration relied on the AUMF as the President’s sole source of power to detain 
enemy belligerents. See Walter E. Kuhn, The Terrorist Detention Review Reform Act: 
Detention Policy and Political Reality, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 221, 227 (2011). 
66 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). President Bush followed the 
precedent set by President Roosevelt in styling the order as a military order, which 
“was intended to emphasize that it came from the president as commander-in-chief, 
not merely as head of the executive branch.” MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 
191. 
67 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. at 57,834. 
68 The privilege was not extended to detainees before trial because the 
government maintained that it would inhibit intelligence gathering and would prove 
unworkable overseas. MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 191. The rules did forbid 
a commission from drawing a negative inference from a decision not to testify, 
however, a prohibition not followed in some European countries. Id. 
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 “The right to a copy of all charges and supporting 
documents, translated to the accused’s native language”; 
and 
 The right to a trial open to the public: Before closing any 
proceeding to the public, the government was required 
to make a showing to the presiding official that, for 
example, closed proceedings were necessary to protect 
against the dissemination of classified information.69 
Moreover, and in line with military practice, the 
commissions required a two-thirds vote to convict in non-capital 
cases, and a unanimous vote to impose the death penalty.70  The 
Department of Defense also promulgated a list of offenses,71 
provided for review panels,72 and took care of other ancillary 
matters, such as defining the qualifications for defense counsel.73  
At first, the commissions did not provide appellate review in a 
federal court; nor were detainees thought to have access to the 
extraordinary relief of habeas corpus.74 
 
69 This list is drawn from MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 191–92. A 
consistent critique of the commissions is their lax rules of evidence, particularly 
hearsay evidence, and the commission’s ability to exclude the accused from 
proceedings and deny his access to evidence in certain circumstances. See, e.g., 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 613–16 (2006); Statement of Lt. Commander 
Charles Swift, Office of Chief Def. Counsel, Office of Military Comm’ns, U.S. 
Department of Defense, reprinted in 76 TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
AND LOCAL CONTROL 330–34 (2007). 
70 MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 191–92. 
71 MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 41, at 181. In this regard, the commissions 
convened by President Bush resemble those convened by General Winfield Scott’s 
order of 1847:  Both delineated the crimes over which the commission would have 
jurisdiction and limited the crimes to those that could not be tried in a court-martial 
and to punishments available in U.S. civilian courts. MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 
37, at 180. 
72 MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 41, at 184–85. 
73 Id. at 184. 
74 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,836 (Nov. 13, 2001). This presumption was not 
unfounded. See, e.g., Pearlman, supra note 65, at 268 (“In light of this precedent, 
especially Eisentrager, and based on government arguments presented in court 
filings, when the first Operation Enduring Freedom detainees arrived at 
Guantánamo Bay in January 2002, it seems the government never expected that the 
detainees would be able to use U.S. federal courts to challenge the lawfulness of 
their detention.”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 506 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“The Commander in Chief and his subordinates had every reason to expect that the 
internment of combatants at Guantanamo Bay would not have the consequence of 
bringing the cumbersome machinery of our domestic courts into military affairs.”). 
President Roosevelt, too, was intent on keeping the Nazi saboteurs out of the civilian 
court system, at one point telling his Attorney General Francis Biddle, “I won’t give 
them up. . . . I won’t hand them over to any United States marshal armed with a 
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This proved not to be the case.75  In the face of several 
lawsuits, Congress made significant changes to the system in an 
attempt to shore up the commissions and insulate them from 
collateral review in federal court.  With the Detainee Treatment 
Act of 2005 (“DTA”),76  Congress amended the federal habeas 
statute to provide that “no court, justice, or judge shall have 
jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the 
 
writ of habeas corpus. Understand?” MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 41, at 99 
(quoting FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 331 (1962)). 
75 The Supreme Court first began to chip away at executive assertions of 
wartime authority to limit detainee access to the federal court system through 
habeas petitions in 2004 with its decisions in Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 
In Rasul, the Court held that the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, extends 
to aliens detained by the United States in Guantánamo Bay, concluding, “[a]liens 
held at the base, no less than American citizens, are entitled to invoke the federal 
court’s authority under § 2241.” 542 U.S. at 466, 481. In Hamdi, a plurality of the 
Court affirmed that through the AUMF, Congress had authorized the detention of 
those persons who joined supporting forces hostile to the United States in 
Afghanistan and who engaged in armed conflict against the United States. Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004). It described this power as a “fundamental and 
accepted . . . incident to war.” Id. However, when the government detains a U.S. 
citizen, the Court held that due process required more robust procedural protections 
in the determination of that individual’s status as an enemy combatant than the 
executive had provided. Id. at 533. Nevertheless, and in what has become a theme in 
the Court’s terrorism cases, the Court left the door open for Congress to fix the issue: 
“There remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated could be met 
by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal.” Id. at 
538. The Deputy Secretary of Defense took the Hamdi plurality’s cue and 
established Combatant Status Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”) to determine whether 
individuals detained at Guantánamo were in fact “enemy combatants” as defined by 
the Department. Memorandum from the Deputy Sec’y of Def. on Order Establishing 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal to the Sec’y of the Navy (July 7, 2004), 
https://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Mackin/MuneerAhmad_ExhibitV.pdf. “A 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal . . . is a one-time administrative process 
designed to determine whether each detainee under the control of the Department of 
Defense at Guantanamo meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy 
combatant.” DEP’T OF DEF., COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL, (2006), 
http://archive.defense.gov/news/Oct2006/d20061017CSRT.pdf. The Government 
maintained that these procedures were designed to comply with the due process 
requirements identified by the plurality in Hamdi. See Pearlman, supra note 65, at 
271. 
76 Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address 
Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-148, 119 Stat. 2680; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Exceptional Courts and the 
Structure of American Military Justice, in GUANTÁNAMO AND BEYOND: EXCEPTIONAL 
COURTS AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 39, 
at 163, 172 (“It was the Court’s grant of certiorari in Hamdan . . . that precipitated 
[the DTA].”). 
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Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba . . . .”77  
Instead, the statute provided statutory appeal to the D.C. Circuit 
in certain instances, including appeal as of right in capital cases 
or where the detainee was sentenced to a prison term of ten years 
or more.78  When the legality of the Bush military commissions 
was finally before the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
the Court was unimpressed with this last-minute addition to the 
commission’s appellate review procedures,79 ruling instead by a 
slim 5-to-4 majority that the commission convened to try 
Hamdan lacked the power to proceed.  The decision provoked an 
aggressive response from Congress. 
D. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
The Hamdan decision is noteworthy if for no other reason 
than for the number of issues on which the Court divided.80  
Justice Stevens’ majority found no constitutional defect with the 
 
77 Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address 
Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119 Stat. 2680 (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)), invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
The act also addressed certain detainee-related issues. For example, it placed 
restrictions on the treatment and interrogation of detainees in U.S. custody. 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 572 (2006). 
78 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2012), invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 
(2008). Review was left to the discretion of the D.C. Circuit and was itself 
circumscribed, limited to: 
Whether the final decision was consistent with the standards and 
procedures specified in the military order referred to in subparagraph (A); 
and 
The extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable, 
whether the use of such standards and procedures to reach the final 
decision is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. 
Id. 
79 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 616 (“[B]ecause Hamdan apparently is not subject to 
the death penalty (at least as matters now stand) and may receive a sentence 
shorter than 10 years’ imprisonment, he has no automatic right to review of the 
commission’s ‘final decision.’ ”); id. at 650 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It is no answer 
that, at the end of the day, the [DTA] affords military-commission defendants the 
opportunity for judicial review in federal court. As the Court is correct to observe, 
the scope of that review is limited.”). 
80 “The Justices divided over (1) the Court’s jurisdiction (5–3); (2) abstention (5–
3); (3) the legality of using military commissions to try a conspiracy charge (4–3); 
(4) the legality of using a military commission lacking the rules and procedures of 
courts-martial (5–3); (5) the enforceability of the Geneva Conventions (5–2); (6) the 
applicability of Common Article 3 to the war with al Qaeda (5–2); and (7) the 
meaning of Common Article 3 (5–3).” Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles 
and National Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23. 
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military commissions; its decision to invalidate the commissions 
was based solely on its interpretation of federal statutes and 
international treaties.  The Court read these statutes as an 
expression of Congress placing limitations on the President’s 
ability to convene military commissions, thus presenting a 
“conflict between Presidential and congressional action.”81  
Consequently, the Court acknowledged that congressional 
authorization could cure the defects it identified and invited 
legislative action.82 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld involved the trial of Salim Ahmed 
Hamdan, a Yemeni national who served as bodyguard and 
personal driver to Osama bin Laden, and who was selected for 
trial by military commission in 2003 for his alleged conspiracy.83  
His appeal reached the Supreme Court in 2006.84  First, the 
Court dodged the DTA’s jurisdiction stripping provision, holding 
that Subsection (e) of § 1005 of the DTA did not apply to cases 
pending when the DTA was enacted.85  The Court reasoned that 
it retained jurisdiction, because Hamdan’s petition had been filed 
and left unresolved before the DTA’s enactment.86  After dealing 
with the jurisdictional question, the Court rejected the 
Government’s request that it abstain from adjudicating 
Hamdan’s petition for writ of habeas corpus until the military 
commission had rendered its final judgment.87  It then moved to 
the merits. 
 
81 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 639 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing the case falls 
within Justice Jackson’s third category in The Steel Seizure Case); id. at 636 (Breyer, 
J., concurring) (“Congress has denied the President the legislative authority to 
create military commissions of the kind at issue here.”). 
82 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Nothing prevents the 
President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”); 
Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Separation of 
Powers after Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933, 961 (2007) (“In 
the three opinions supporting the [Hamdan] result, the one constant was the 
emphasis on empowering Congress.”). 
83 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 569–70. 
84 Id. at 570. 
85 Id. at 575–76. 
86 Id. But see id. at 672 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding the Constitution’s 
Exceptions Clause (Art. III, § 2) “permits exactly what Congress had done here” with 
the DTA). 
87 The Hamdan abstention decision will be scrutinized more closely in the 
following Part, but it is worth pausing to consider Professor Sunstein’s remarks on 
the question of abstention: “In view of the novelty and delicacy of the underlying 
questions, a great deal can be said on behalf of a genuinely minimalist course: 
abstention.” Sunstein, supra note 80, at 34. This approach would have avoided 
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The Court first concluded that neither the AUMF nor the 
DTA provided specific, congressional authorization for the 
military commissions at issue.88  As a result, the Court turned to 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) and determined 
that the President’s use of military commissions is conditioned on 
compliance with the UCMJ itself, in addition to the American 
common law of war, and the Geneva Conventions.89  Having set 
forth this rule of law, the Court determined that the current 
system of military commissions violated all three.90 
First, the Court concluded that the President promulgated 
rules of procedure that departed from those used in courts-
martial without adequately demonstrating why the court-martial 
rules would be impracticable under the circumstances.91  The 
Court viewed the rules of procedures that permitted commissions 
to exclude the accused from proceedings, denied him access to 
evidence in certain circumstances, and deviated from evidentiary 
rules used in courts-martial, such as those governing hearsay, as 
particularly problematic because they were inconsistent with the 
UCMJ.92  Focusing on two provisions in the UCMJ, Articles 36(a) 
and 36(b),93 the Court concluded that the former required the 
 
thorny questions surrounding the AUMF, the UCMJ, and the Geneva Conventions. 
Id. Furthermore, had the Court abstained, “it would have had an opportunity to 
resolve the central questions after a trial, and thus after learning about the actual 
(rather than hypothesized) nature of the particular procedures.” Id. at 35. In light of 
this, “the course of abstention would have had many virtues.” Id. at 36. 
88 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593–94. This reading is “an extremely cramped and 
unworkable interpretation of the expansive authorization that Congress gave the 
President in the AUMF,” according to the former United States Solicitor General 
Theodore Olson. Testimony of Theodore B. Olson, Former U.S. Solicitor General, 
reprinted in 76 TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL, 
221 (2007) [hereinafter Testimony of Theodore B. Olson]. Because the Court already 
construed the AUMF as authorizing the President to exercise his war powers, see 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004), a “rational and reasonable reading of 
the AUMF is that it endorsed the President’s . . . establishment of the military 
commissions.” Testimony of Theodore B. Olson, supra. 
89 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 584–85. 
90 Justice Stevens lost Justice Kennedy on whether trying enemy combatants 
for conspiracy was a violation of the American common law of war. 
91 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 620. 
92 Id. at 621–22. For a helpful chart comparing procedural rights in courts-
martial, the Bush military commissions, the Nuremberg Trials, and the ad-hoc 
tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, see 76 TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 255–75 (2007); see also supra note 69. 
93 The two provisions read as follows: 
(a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for 
cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military 
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President to determine that it would be impracticable to apply in 
the military commission the rules and principles of law that 
govern trial in federal district courts, and the latter required an 
additional impracticability judgment regarding the application of 
court-martial rules in the military commission setting.94  Because 
the Court was unsatisfied with the President’s showing of 
impracticability, the Court concluded that the commissions 
violated the uniformity principle codified in Article 36(b) of the 
UCMJ.95 
The Court also found that Article 21 of the UCMJ required 
the commissions to comply with the laws of war, which it 
concluded incorporated the Geneva Conventions and the Hague 
Convention, overturning the contrary conclusion by the Court of 
Appeals.96  The Court first determined that Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions applied to agents of al Qaida, a stateless 
terrorist group.97  This conclusion triggered Common Article 3’s 
requirement that Hamdan be tried in a “regularly constituted 
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized 
as indispensable by civilized peoples.”98  Circling back to its 
assessment of the commissions as violative of the UCMJ, the 
 
commissions and other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of 
inquiry, may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so 
far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of 
evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United 
States district courts, but which may not, except as provided in chapter 47A 
of this title, be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter. 
(b) All rules and regulations made under this article shall be uniform 
insofar as practicable, except insofar as applicable to military commissions 
established under chapter 47A of this title.  
10 U.S.C. § 836 (2012) (emphasis added). 
94 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 622–23; id. at 639–40 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
95 Id. at 624 (majority opinion). Specifically, the Court found the President did 
not make a satisfactory determination that it would be impracticable to apply the 
rules for courts-martial, violating subsection (b). Id. at 623. 
96 Id. at 625–26. 
97 Id. at 631–32. But see Statement of Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant 
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, reprinted in 76 
TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 211 (2007) (“The 
United States has never before applied common Article 3 in the context of an armed 
conflict with international terrorists. When the Geneva Conventions were concluded 
in 1949, of course, the drafters of the Conventions certainly did not anticipate, and 
did not agree to cover, armed conflicts with international terrorist organizations 
such as al Qaeda.”). 
98 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631–32 (2006) (quoting Article 3 of the Geneva 
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, (1955) 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, T.I.A.S. No. 3364). 
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Court explained that the commissions could only be considered 
“regularly constituted court[s]” if they followed the standards of 
military justice set forth in the court-martial process.99  Adopted 
without sufficient explanation from the President, the Court 
reiterated the structural and procedural deficiencies it had found 
and held that the commission convened to try Hamdan did not 
meet the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.100 
The Hamdan decision was a significant defeat for the Bush 
administration.  It did not, of course, find that military 
commissions are unconstitutional as a general matter, only that 
the ones employed by the Bush administration to prosecute 
terrorists were in conflict with congressional statutes limiting 
their use.  Interestingly, this putative conflict between 
congressional concerns and the executive’s actions did not reflect 
on-the-ground realities in 2006.  Congress responded rapidly to 
Hamdan by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006 
(“2006 MCA”),101  which undid much of the Hamdan holding and 
took the unusually aggressive step of completely eliminating the 
Court’s jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from Guantánamo 
detainees.102 
E. The Military Commissions Acts and Commissions Under the 
Obama Administration 
The Hamdan decision was issued on June 29, 2006; the 
House Armed Services Committee commenced hearings on the 
subject on July 12, 2006.103  Before the year had ended, Congress 
passed the 2006 MCA, which President Bush signed into law in 
October.104 
 
99 Id. at 632–34. But see id. at 715 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
100 Id. at 634 (majority opinion). But see id. at 725 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
101 Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections in 10, 18, and 28 U.S.C.). 
102 The jurisdiction-stripping provision that resulted from Hamdan ended with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush, where the Court held that the 
provision operated as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 
553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
103 Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Blocks Guantánamo Tribunals, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 29, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/29/washington/29cnd-scot 
us.html. 
104 Statement by President George W. Bush upon Signing S. 3930, 2006 
U.S.C.C.A.N. S61 (Oct. 17, 2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court ruled that the military 
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Taking the Hamdan Court’s cue, Congress patterned the 
military commissions under the 2006 MCA after courts-martial 
under the UCMJ.105  That said, the 2006 MCA largely exempted 
commissions from the requirements of the UCMJ—notably, the 
speedy trial requirements106—and the Geneva Conventions.107  
The statute also provided for more robust appellate review and 
enhanced evidentiary rules in favor of the accused.108  It 
authorized the Secretary of Defense to establish an intermediate 
appellate tribunal, the Court of Military Commission Review 
(“CMCR”), whose decisions were to be reviewed by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.109  
Moreover, the statute aligned the rules governing hearsay with 
those used in courts-martial, providing the accused with an 
opportunity to prove that hearsay evidence, not otherwise 
admissible in courts-martial, should be excluded because it is 
“unreliable or lacking in probative value.”110  Finally, Congress 
incorporated a slightly modified version of the Classified 
Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”) to govern the handling of 
classified information and the procedures governing closed 
sessions.111 
 
 
 
 
commissions needed to be explicitly authorized by the United States Congress. And 
so I asked Congress for that authority, and they have provided it.”). 
105 MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 193; Vladeck, supra note 76, at 165. 
106 10 U.S.C. § 948b(d)(1)(A) (2012). 
107 Id. § 948b(g). 
108 Id. § 950c. 
109 Id. § 950g(a). This procedure was similar to the courts-martial appeals 
process. Commission convictions would be automatically reviewable by CMCR, just 
as courts-martial decisions are reviewable by the Courts of Criminal Appeals of the 
Armed Forces. MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 193. CMCR decisions could then 
be appealed through the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
and then to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and finally by petition to the Supreme 
Court. Id. 
110 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(E) (2012). Additionally, the Government was required 
to produce exculpatory documents. Cf. Statement of Lt. Commander Charles Swift, 
Office of Chief Def. Counsel, Office of Military Comm’ns, U.S. Department of 
Defense, reprinted in 76 TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL 
CONTROL 331 (2007) (arguing that under the Bush administration commission rules, 
“the Prosecution had no obligation to disclose evidence from other government 
agencies suggesting the defendant was innocent”). 
111 MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 193; see also 10 U.S.C. § 949d(c) (2012). 
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When Barack Obama assumed office in 2008, the future of 
the military commissions at Guantánamo became uncertain, 
given the new President’s oft-stated opposition to Guantánamo.112  
But after initially promising to close the detention facility at 
Guantánamo Bay indefinitely, President Obama sought to reform 
and utilize the military commissions rather than dismantle 
them.113  Congress obliged and revised the 2006 MCA in 2009.114  
The amendments added several procedural protections for enemy 
combatants, expanded the availability of appellate review,115 and 
altered the structure of the CMCR, requiring it to be composed of 
both military and civilian judges who are appointed by the 
president with the advice and consent of the Senate.116  It also 
enhanced the rights of an accused in certain ways, such as by 
more closely defining hearsay.117  The  
 
 
112 See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4899 (Jan. 22, 2009) 
(temporarily suspending the operations of the Guantánamo Bay military 
commissions). 
113 See Editorial, The Prison that Won't Go Away, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/09/opinion/09wed2.html. Indeed, President Obama 
cleared military prosecutors at Guantánamo in 2011 to try five detainees. See 
Charlie Savage, In a Reversal, Military Trials for 9/11 Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/us/05gitmo.html. The change of policy 
was never a change of heart, of course, and President Obama never stopped calling 
for Guantánamo’s closure. Jens David Ohlin, One More Time All Together: Obama 
Wants To Close Gitmo, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 23, 2016, 11:01 AM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2016/02/23/32410/. In fairness, the former President’s political 
statements regarding Guantánamo do little justice to his views on the use of 
military commissions, which are nuanced. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, 
Remarks by the President on National Security, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (May 21, 2009, 
10:28 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-national-security-5-21-09 (“Military commissions have a history in the 
United States dating back to George Washington and the Revolutionary War. They 
are an appropriate venue for trying detainees for violations of the laws of war. They 
allow for the protection of sensitive sources and methods of intelligence-gathering; 
they allow for the safety and security of participants; and for the presentation of 
evidence gathered from the battlefield that cannot always be effectively presented in 
federal courts.”). 
114 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 Pub. L. No. 111-84, 
123 Stat. 2190, 2574-614 (2009). 
115 Vladeck, supra note 76, at 174. 
116 10 U.S.C. § 950f (2012). 
117 See Solis, supra note 39, at 89. The 2009 MCA also prohibited the use of 
statements made under torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Id. 
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ultimate result of the 2009 amendments was “to produce a 
structure that closely (and intentionally) mirrors the current 
structure for direct and collateral review of courts-martial.”118 
In short, the congressional response in the form of the MCA 
provided the express legislative sanction of military commissions 
that the Hamdan Court requested and provided for a robust 
appeals process to federal court.  These changes set the stage for 
Al-Nashiri II, where a panel of judges deferred to the military 
commissions, arguing that “[m]uch has changed since 
Hamdan.”119  As the foregoing makes clear, “[t]he current system 
of military commissions at Guantanamo Bay ‘is the product of an 
extended dialogue among the President, the Congress, and the 
Supreme Court.’ ”120  That dialogue is on full display in the recent 
decision by the D.C. Circuit in Al-Nashiri II. 
III. AL-NASHIRI II 
In the present round of litigation,121 al-Nashiri argued that 
the offenses for which he has been charged122 are not “triable” by 
a military commission under the MCA because they were not 
 
118 Vladeck, supra note 76, at 175; see also Glazier, supra note 41, at 2024 
(“[H]istorical analysis and the writings of military justice commentators reveal an 
original practice of close conformity between the procedures of [courts-martial and 
military commissions].”). 
119 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d 110, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
120 Id. at 114 (quoting Al-Nashiri I, 791 F.3d 71, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2015)); see also Ori 
Aronson, In/visible Courts: Military Tribunals as Other Spaces, in SECRECY, 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE VINDICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW  229, 232 
(David Cole et al. eds., 2013) (“The decade since [September 11, 2001] has witnessed 
an ongoing inter-branch process of recalibration of the procedural, institutional, and 
constitutional elements of the reinvented military commissions system, including 
several rounds of legislation, judicial review, and executive policy adjustments.”). 
121 See discussion supra note 4. 
122 Al-Nashiri has been charged with the following: 
(1) using treachery or perfidy 
(2) murder in violation of the law of war 
(3) attempted murder in violation of the law of war 
(4) terrorism 
(5) conspiracy 
(6) intentionally causing serious bodily injury 
(7) attacking civilians 
(8) attacking civilian objects 
(9) hijacking or hazarding a vessel or aircraft. 
Charge Sheet at 3–5, 10, 12, United States v. al-Nashiri, Charge Sheet (Mil. 
Comm’ns Trial Judiciary Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alN 
ashiri2/Al%20Nashiri%20II%20(Referred%20Charges).pdf. “The government is 
seeking the death penalty.” Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 114. 
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“committed in the context of . . . hostilities,” which is a 
prerequisite for the military commission’s exercise of jurisdiction 
under the 2009 MCA.123  The court did not reach the 
jurisdictional question, however, opting to apply Councilman 
abstention to the military commission convened to try al-Nashiri.  
Before evaluating the court’s extension of Councilman to the 
military commissions, the next Section outlines the underlying 
jurisdictional question raised by counsel for al-Nashiri. 
A. The Underlying Jurisdictional Question 
As Judge Griffith noted at the beginning of his analysis, Al-
Nashiri II presented a relatively narrow question.124  The 
petitioner did not challenge “the structural or procedural 
features of the military commissions created by Congress,” nor 
did he claim that the “commissions are unconstitutional” or that 
he was improperly classified as an “alien unprivileged enemy 
belligerent.”125  Instead, al-Nashiri’s petition126 challenged only 
the commission’s authority to try him for the crimes he is alleged 
to have committed before September 11, 2001. 
The 2009 MCA authorizes the President “to establish 
military commissions . . . for offenses triable by military 
commission.”127  Offenses are triable by military commission 
“only if the offense is committed in the context of and associated 
with hostilities.”128  The statute further defined hostilities as “any 
conflict subject to the laws of war.”129  The jurisdiction question 
turns, then, on how the court will define the “context of 
 
123 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 116. A military judge denied the same arguments 
on a motion to dismiss in 2012, reasoning that “the existence of hostilities was a 
mixed question of law and fact” to be proven by the government at trial. Id. For a 
critique of the commission’s jurisdictional decision, authored by Judge Pohl, see 
Keven Jon Heller, Judge Pohl: The US and AQ Were Engaged in Hostilities in 1775, 
OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 16, 2013, 7:57 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/01/16/judge-pohl-
the-us-and-aq-were-engaged-in-hostilities-in-1775/ (providing a link to the 
commission decision). 
124 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 116. 
125 Id. 
126 Al-Nashiri also sought mandamus relief, asking the court to dissolve the 
military commission convened to try him on the ground that his alleged acts were 
not committed in the context of hostilities. Id. at 117. 
127 10 U.S.C. § 948b(b) (2012). 
128 Id. § 950p(c) (2012). 
129 Id. § 948a(9) (2012). 
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hostilities.”130 In other words, when did the war with al Qaida 
begin?  Judge Griffith framed the disagreement between the 
parties over how to answer this question as follows: 
Should the existence of hostilities be determined based on the 
totality of the circumstances, or only on the understanding of 
the political branches?  And may it be based on a retrospective 
analysis or only on what decisionmakers believed at the time of 
the events?  Al-Nashiri and amici believe that the judgments of 
the political branches at the time are what matters; the 
Government takes a broader view.131 
The court did not decide this weighty issue, however.  
Instead, it extended Councilman abstention to the military 
commission context and declined to adjudicate al-Nashiri’s 
jurisdictional challenge, which will now be resolved by the 
military commission in the first instance.132  The following 
Section turns to the court’s abstention decision. 
 
130 The “context of hostilities” question has attracted scholarly attention and is 
beyond the scope of this Note. See, e.g., Laurie Blank & Benjamin Farley, 
Determining When the Armed Conflict with Al-Qaeda Started, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 
11, 2016, 9:35 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/29898/determining-armed-conflict-
al-qaeda-started/; Laurie Blank & Benjamin R. Farley, Identifying the Start of 
Conflict: Conflict Recognition, Operational Realities and Accountability in the Post 
9/11 World, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 467 (2015). By charging several detainees, 
including al-Nashiri, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and other 9/11 attackers, with war 
crimes for conduct dating back to 1996, the United States has adopted the position 
that the armed conflict with al Qaida began before 9/11. Id. at 491. The existence of 
an armed conflict triggers the application of the law of armed conflict (“LOAC”), with 
its attendant obligations. Id. at 469. 
131 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d 110, 137 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Put simply, if hostilities did 
not “exist” until after September 11, 2001, then al-Nashiri’s crimes, committed in 
October 2000, are not triable by the military commissions under the 2009 MCA. The 
Government takes a different view of the hostilities question, responding that the 
existence of hostilities is established by considering the totality of the circumstances, 
and that the Cole attack was part of al Qaida’s strategy to wage war against the 
United States. Id. at 136. To the contrary, al-Nashiri asserts that hostilities exist 
only when the political branches say so in a “contemporaneous public act”; al-Nashiri 
is quick to note that President Clinton’s public statement in response to the Cole 
bombing made clear that the nation was not at war. Id. But this position puts al-
Nashiri in an awkward situation when it comes to the argument that the court 
should not abstain, because for al-Nashiri, joint action by Congress and the 
President is not sufficient for the court to abstain, Oral Argument at 14:30, Al-
Nashiri II, 835 F.3d 110 (2016), https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/record 
ings2016.nsf/77A3A67AD3EF915385257F5C006765E1/$file/15-1023.mp3, but joint 
action by the political branches, in the form of a public statement or act of Congress, 
is necessary to trigger the existence of hostilities. 
132 Pursuant to the MCA, “[a] military commission is a competent tribunal to 
make a finding sufficient for jurisdiction.” 10 U.S.C. § 948d (2012). 
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B. Abstention Doctrine 
The court’s abstention analysis involves a two-step inquiry: 
(1) Does abstention doctrine apply to the military commissions 
generally?  And if so, (2) Do any of the exceptions identified in 
abstention jurisprudence apply to al-Nashiri’s unique 
circumstances?133  To understand the court’s answer to both 
questions, a review of abstention doctrine is in order. 
The doctrine of abstention first arose in the context of 
criminal prosecutions as an exception to the “strict duty” that 
federal courts have to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon 
them by Congress.134  The general rule is that so long as the 
defendant has an adequate remedy in the form of a trial and 
direct appeal, federal courts should not exercise their equitable 
discretion135 to enjoin ongoing state criminal proceedings.136  In 
Younger v. Harris,137 the United States Supreme Court 
established the current standard for applying abstention to state 
criminal prosecutions by articulating two considerations that 
favored abstention in the face of ongoing state criminal 
proceedings: (1) the traditional rule that courts of equity should 
not enjoin criminal prosecutions where an adequate remedy at 
law exists,138 and (2) interests of comity, or “federalism,” that 
ward against interference in ongoing state proceedings because it 
would disrupt the careful balance between state and federal 
power.139 
Grounding its decision in Younger, the Court in Schlesinger 
v. Councilman extended abstention doctrine to courts-martial.140  
Councilman involved a court-martial convened to try an Army 
officer for allegedly selling and possessing marijuana.141  The case 
reached the Supreme Court after the defendant filed suit in a  
 
 
133 Cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 589 n.20 (2006). 
134 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 118 (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins., 517 
U.S. 706, 716 (1996)). 
135 The court describes the practice of abstaining as “a basic doctrine of equity 
jurisprudence.” Id. at 118 (quoting Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2015)); 
see also Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 754 (1975) (describing abstention 
as a “federal equity power”). 
136 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 118 (citing Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 26). 
137 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
138 Id. at 43–44. 
139 Id. at 44–45. 
140 Councilman, 420 U.S. at 757. 
141 Id. at 741. 
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federal district court to enjoin the court-martial proceeding on 
the ground that the alleged offense was not “service connected,” 
and as a result could not be tried in a court-martial.142 
The Court acknowledged that the second consideration 
outlined in Younger, that is, the interests of federalism, did not 
apply to a court-martial proceeding, but further explained that 
two “factors equally compelling” led to the conclusion that 
abstention was proper.143  First, “military discipline” is best 
served when the federal judicial system refrains from interfering 
in the military justice system.144  Second, federal courts ought to 
respect the balance that Congress struck between military 
preparedness and fairness to individual service members when it 
“created an integrated system of military courts and review 
procedures.”145  An important component of this “respect” is the 
assumption that the scheme Congress created will adequately 
protect the constitutional rights of servicepersons.146  This 
assumption makes clear that whether to abstain does not hinge 
on an examination of the “on-the-ground performance of the 
system that Congress and the Executive have established.”147 
Nearly three decades later, the Court in Hamdan considered 
whether to extend the principles set forth in Councilman to the 
military commissions.  It concluded that “neither of the comity 
considerations identified in Councilman weighs in favor of 
abstention in this case.”148  Dismissing the concern for “military 
discipline,” the Court noted that Hamdan was not a member of 
the armed forces.149  Turning to the second consideration, the 
Court determined that unlike the court-martial convened to try 
the serviceman in Councilman, “the tribunal convened to try 
Hamdan is not part of the integrated system of military courts, 
complete with independent review panels, that Congress has 
 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 757. 
144 Id. at 743, 757. 
145 Id. at 757–58. 
146 Id. at 758 (“[I]mplicit in the congressional scheme embodied in the [UCMJ] is 
the view that the military court system generally is adequate to and responsibly will 
perform its assigned task. We think this congressional judgment must be respected 
and that it must be assumed that the military court system will vindicate 
servicemen’s constitutional rights.”). 
147 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d 110, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Councilman, 420 
U.S. at 758). 
148 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 587 (2006). 
149 Id. 
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established.”150  In declining to abstain, the Court explained that 
the government had not identified any “important countervailing 
interest” to justify abstention.151  As a result, it concluded that Ex 
parte Quirin, where the Court intervened in an ongoing military 
commission, was the most relevant precedent.152 
Nevertheless, the Hamdan Court narrowed its abstention 
holding by declining to “foreclose the possibility that abstention 
may be appropriate in some cases seeking review of ongoing 
military commission proceedings. . . .”153  This language left an 
opening for lower courts154 reviewing habeas petitions from 
Guantánamo in the wake of Hamdan, and, in due course, for the 
D.C. Circuit in Al-Nashiri II. 
C. Extending Councilman to the Military Commission Context 
Having examined the Supreme Court’s abstention 
jurisprudence, the court in Al-Nashiri II concluded that the 
District Court had appropriately extended the principles 
announced in Councilman to al-Nashiri’s case.155  First, Judge 
Griffith pointed out that “[m]uch has changed since Hamdan.”156  
Specifically, the enhanced procedural protections and rigorous 
review mechanisms the Hamdan Court found lacking were 
established when Congress passed the MCA, thus giving the 
executive explicit authority to try enemy combatants by military 
commission.157  Seeking guidance from Councilman’s “equally 
 
150 Id. The Court pointed out specifically that Hamdan had no right to appeal 
his conviction to a panel comprised of civilian judges who would be insulated from 
military influence. Id. 
151 Id. at 589. Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion also addressed the 
government’s abstention argument, concluding abstention was appropriate. Id. at 
672–78 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, Justice Scalia 
found the “two considerations of comity” identified in Councilman—“the closest 
analogue in our jurisprudence”—as well as a third consideration  “all cut in favor of 
abstention.” Id. at 673. He reasoned that the federal court system should avoid 
“direct conflict with the Executive in an area where the Executive’s competence is 
maximal and ours is virtually nonexistent,” a principle, grounded in “considerations 
of interbranch comity,” that should have led the Court to abstain. Id. at 676–77. 
152 Id. at 588–89 (majority opinion). 
153 Id. at 590. 
154 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130, 136–37 (D.D.C. 2008); Al-
Nashiri v. MacDonald, No. 11-5907 RJB, 2012 WL 1642306, at *11 (W.D. Wash. May 
10, 2012) (“[U]nder the principles of abstention announced in Councilman, the court 
should not exercise equitable jurisdiction.”). 
155 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d 110, 118 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
156 Id. at 120. 
157 Id. at 121. 
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compelling” factors, the court evaluated the two comity 
considerations in Councilman and distilled the following rule:  
For Councilman abstention to apply, courts must “be assured of 
both the adequacy of the alternative system” in protecting a 
defendant’s rights, and the “importance of the interests served by 
allowing that system to proceed uninterrupted by federal 
courts.”158 
Having crafted that rule, the court articulated two questions 
that would guide its application: (1) Whether the system enacted 
to adjudicate al-Nashiri’s guilt would adequately protect his 
rights; and (2) Whether an “important countervailing interest” 
justified the district court’s decision to avoid adjudicating a 
pretrial challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of a military 
commission created under the 2009 MCA.159 
1. Whether the MCA Will Adequately Protect Detainee Rights 
The court was “convinced” of the adequacy of the 2009 MCA’s 
review structure given its similarity to the review system for 
courts-martial approved by Councilman.160  Judge Griffith first 
listed the similarities: the composition and commission of the 
military commissions “closely mirror[s]” that of a court-martial161 
and “the structure of appellate review is virtually identical across 
the two systems.”162  Harkening back to Justice Scalia’s argument 
 
158 Id. (emphasis in original). The court explained further that this approach 
“made sense in light of its abstention jurisprudence.” Id. The adequacy prong was 
derived from the Councilman Court’s decision not to “evaluate the on-the-ground 
performance of courts-martial” proceedings, but rather to assume “the sufficiency of 
the structure Congress created . . . .” Id. As to the importance prong, the Court 
reasoned that Councilman believed abstention would serve the vital interest of 
military discipline, which would be stymied by federal court intrusion. Id. 
159 Id. at 122. 
160 Id.; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 672–78 (2006) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
161 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 122. Both have twelve members in capital cases 
and a presiding military judge. Id. Moreover, the MCA aligned the rules of evidence 
used in commissions with those used in courts-martial, 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a) (2012), 
which is particularly important in the context of hearsay, 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(3)(D) 
(2012). Finally, Congress incorporated a slightly modified version of the Classified 
Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”) to govern the handling of classified information 
and the procedures governing closed sessions. 10 U.S.C. § 949d(c) (2012). 
162 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 122. The MCA authorized the Secretary of Defense 
to establish an intermediate appellate tribunal, the CMCR, whose decisions were to 
be reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia with 
the possibility of review by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 10 U.S.C. § 
950g(a)–(e) (2012). 
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in Hamdan, the majority contended that the review structure 
under the 2009 MCA is arguably “more insulated from military 
influence than is the [review] structure for courts-martial.”163 
Notwithstanding the evidentiary and procedural differences 
between courts-martial proceedings and military commissions 
under the 2009 MCA,164 the court concluded that the 2009 MCA 
is “sufficiently adequate to point in favor of abstention.”165  Al-
Nashiri’s claims to the contrary were unavailing because they 
asked the court to “determine whether pretrial intervention is 
warranted by examining the on-the-ground performance of the 
system Congress and the Executive [had] established,” which is 
 
163 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 123 (citing Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 675–76 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). Whereas the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces serves as the 
ultimate review body for courts-martial proceedings under the UCMJ, the defendant 
in a military commission under the 2009 MCA can appeal the CMCR’s ultimate 
decision to the D.C. Circuit court, whose judges have Article III’s guarantees of life 
tenure and salary protection. Id. at 122–23. 
164 See Denny LeBoeuf, Executing the Evidence, ACLU: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
PROJECT (Jan. 20, 2011, 12:23 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/executing-
evidence?redirect=blog/capital-punishment-national-security/executing-evidence 
(arguing the military commissions are plagued by “unfairly lax rules for allowing 
evidence, admission of coerced testimony, and censorship of evidence of the torture 
of prisoners”). But see Solis, supra note 39, at 75 (“In keeping with their utilitarian 
in-the-field-nature, [military commissions] have employed less stringent rules of 
procedure and evidence than are found in either domestic courts or courts-martial.”). 
Relatedly, Al-Nashiri has claimed that his 2007 confession to USS Cole bombing was 
coerced through five years of torture. Gabriel Haboubi, Guantanamo Detainee Says 
Torture Prompted Confession to USS Cole Bombing, JURIST: PAPERCHASE (Mar. 30, 
2007, 3:42 PM), http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2007/03/guantanamo-detainee-
says-torture.php. Nevertheless, the Al-Nashiri II court believed that al-Nashiri’s 
trial will include “a number of significant procedural and evidentiary safeguards,” 
including “the right to be represented by counsel, 10 U.S.C. § 949c, be presumed 
innocent, id. § 949l, obtain and offer exculpatory evidence, id. § 949j . . . and 
challenge for cause any of the members of the military commission and the military 
judge, id. § 949f.” Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 123. Importantly, al-Nashiri did not 
challenge the ability of the military commission and its various appellate bodies to 
fully adjudicate his defense. Id. 
165 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 123. Another Comment analyzing the Al-Nashiri II 
decision questions this conclusion. Recent Case, In re Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d 110 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016), 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1249 (2017) [hereinafter Harvard Comment]. Focusing 
on the fact that the MCA, unlike the rules for courts-martial, does not guarantee 
prompt appellate review, the author argues that the possibility of undue delay 
renders the commission system inadequate for the purposes of abstention. Id. at 
1252–53. But the court addressed al-Nashiri’s claims of unreasonable delay and 
found that he was complicit in the delay. Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 135 (“We decline 
to label unreasonable or excessive a delay Al-Nashiri has not contested.”). Although 
the court was “troubled” by the prospective delay, it reasoned soundly that al-
Nashiri did not come with clean hands. Id. 
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exactly what Councilman declined to do.166  Just as such a 
scrupulous review was unwarranted when examining the 
congressionally established court-martial system in Councilman, 
it is also unwarranted when examining the congressionally 
established military commission system.167  The court concluded 
that, absent a showing of unlawfulness or inability to fully 
defend himself, al-Nashiri must proceed through the process 
Congress created in the 2009 MCA.168 
2. Whether an “Important Countervailing Interest” Warrants 
Abstention 
Unlike the Supreme Court in Hamdan, the Al-Nashiri II 
court identified an “important countervailing interest” to support 
its decision to abstain: “the need for federal courts to avoid 
exercising their equitable powers in a manner that would unduly 
impinge on the prerogatives of the political branches in the 
sensitive realm of national security.”169  The court understood the 
provision for direct Article III review of al-Nashiri’s jurisdictional 
challenge on appeal as an implicit instruction from Congress and 
the President that judicial review should await the outcome of 
the military commission proceeding.170  Further, because the 
executive and legislative judgment providing for delayed Article 
III review “was made out of concern for national security needs,” 
the court concluded it must defer to that judgment.171 
In short, the President sought authority from Congress to 
convene military commissions he deemed necessary, and 
Congress gave it to him in the Military Commissions Acts, which 
delay Article III review until the military commission has issued 
a final decision.172  Unwilling to disturb executive-legislative 
cooperation on a core strategic component of warmaking—
prosecuting the enemy—the Al-Nashiri II court deferred to the  
 
 
166 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 123 (citing Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 
738, 758 (1975) (concluding Congress’ judgment that the military court system is 
adequate to perform its assigned task must be respected)). 
167 But see Vladeck, supra note 10. 
168 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 123. 
169 Id. at 124. 
170 Id. at 125. 
171 Id. at 124. 
172 Id. 
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political branches’ instruction as to the timing of Article III 
review and decided Councilman abstention doctrine was 
appropriately extended to the military commissions.173 
D. Judge Tatel’s Dissent 
Al-Nashiri argued that, even if Councilman applied, the 
“unique” features of his case qualified him for the “extraordinary 
circumstances” exception to the abstention doctrine.174  Under 
this exception, a federal court may intervene where a plaintiff 
demonstrates that his circumstances present the “threat of ‘great 
and immediate’ injury and render the alternative tribunal 
‘incapable of fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issues 
before it.’ ”175  Although the majority found that al-Nashiri’s 
asserted harm was only “attendant to resolution of his case in the 
military court system,”176 the dissent took issue with this 
conclusion in light of the “years of brutal detention and 
interrogation tactics” to which al-Nashiri was subjected.177  Judge 
Tatel went on to chronicle the chilling details of al-Nashiri’s 
treatment,178 concluding that the harms al-Nashiri will suffer 
 
173 Id. at 125–26. 
174 Id. at 128. Al-Nashiri made two additional arguments that were unavailing. 
First, he argued that allowing the commission to proceed would violate his 
constitutional and statutory “right not to be tried.” Id. at 131–35. Second, he argued 
that the court should intervene because his commission proceedings have been 
plagued by unreasonable delays. Id. at 135–36. 
175 Id. (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 123–24 (1975)). 
176 Id. (quoting Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 758 (1975)). 
177 Id. at 140 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
178 Denny LeBoeuf provides a poignant description of the enhanced 
interrogation tactics to which al-Nashiri was subjected: 
U.S. officials waterboarded al-Nashiri. They bent him over backwards in a 
stress position until one of his interrogators worried that his arms would 
become dislocated. He was naked, hooded, shackled, and deprived of sleep. 
His “debriefers” blew smoke in his face, stood on his ankle shackles, and 
scrubbed his naked body with a stiff wire brush. His torturers hung him 
from the ceiling by his arms, while they were tied behind his back. And if 
these medieval torments were not enough to render a subsequent capital 
trial problematic, his torturers also revved a power drill next to his naked, 
hooded body. And racked a handgun near his head. “Once or twice.” 
Denny LeBoeuf, supra note 164; see also Richard Esposito & Jason Ryan, CIA Chief: 
We Waterboarded, ABC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/TheLaw/ 
story?id=4244423&page=1. But see Memorandum from Scott W. Muller to John Yoo 
on the Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of Captured 
Al-Qa’ida Personnel (Apr. 28, 2003), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files 
/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc17.pdf (stating that the foregoing 
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from the government’s prosecution of him in a military 
commission are “a far cry from the ordinary burdens . . . that 
individuals endure in the course of defending against criminal 
prosecutions.”179 
Sympathetic to the dissent’s argument, Judge Griffith 
remained unconvinced that the extraordinary circumstances 
exception applied.180  Because al-Nashiri failed to show that the 
military commission would not provide him a fair trial, and out of 
a concern for reshaping the scope of the exception to “create a 
novel free-floating exception for psychological harm,” the 
majority decided the District Court correctly extended and 
applied Councilman abstention to al-Nashiri’s petition.181  The 
next Part evaluates this conclusion and examines its 
consequences for ongoing military commission proceedings. 
IV. THE VIRTUES OF ABSTENTION 
This Part sets out to assess the different outcomes in 
Hamdan and Al-Nashiri II, focusing on the role deference played 
in the latter decision and clarifying the separation of powers 
argument underlying the result.  This Part also articulates the 
decision’s consequences for future collateral attacks on 
commission proceedings. 
A. Deference and Separation of Powers: Assessing the Different 
Outcomes in Hamdan and Al-Nashiri II 
Under the 2009 MCA, Congress decided that federal courts 
should be limited to exercising post-trial review of the final 
judgments of military commissions.  Applying Councilman 
abstention to military commissions under the 2009 MCA ensures 
that legislative prerogative is carried out.182  The Hamdan Court 
made clear that congressional involvement in crafting the 
military commissions would resolve the deficiencies it had 
identified; following that guidance, the Al-Nashiri II court 
deferred where Hamdan did not.  The vehicle for this deferential 
posture was abstention, which allowed the court to defer to the 
 
interrogation “techniques . . . violate neither Federal criminal law nor the Fifth, 
Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments”). 
179 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 140. 
180 Id. at 129 (majority opinion). 
181 Id. at 130. 
182 Margulies, supra note 8. 
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judgment of the political branches that prosecuting some enemy 
detainees in a military commission is in the nation’s best 
interest, and that those commissions should be left undisturbed 
until they issue a final ruling.  The benefits of this deferential 
approach are twofold:  First, it will inform and narrow eventual 
Article III review of the commission’s decision, as well as 
congressional review of the military commission system 
generally.  Second, it provides guidance for lower courts that will 
ensure uniform adjudication of habeas petitions from 
Guantánamo. 
Before discussing the decision’s impact, it is important to 
clarify what the Al-Nashiri II court deferred to, and what it did 
not.  The panel deferred to the considered, measured judgment of 
Congress that military commissions are the appropriate forum 
for trying some enemy detainees, and that Article III courts 
should review the final judgments of these commissions.  The 
panel did not defer to the military commissions themselves, as 
the dissent contended and some commentators have suggested.183  
Counsel for al-Nashiri did not claim that the military commission 
convened to try him suffered from a structural or procedural 
defect.  Nor did he assert that the commission itself was 
unconstitutional.  Had there been a showing of either, then 
deference would have been inappropriate.184  But because the 
only argument put forth by al-Nashiri—that the commission 
lacked jurisdiction to try him—is a question that Congress 
expressly authorized the commission to determine, the court 
respected that judgment.185 
The court emphasized that it would not base its abstention 
decision on the on-the-ground performance of the military 
commissions, which has been unimpressive at best.186  But this is 
a byproduct of the court’s deference to the congressionally 
sanctioned military commission system in the first place.  The 
 
183 Vladeck, supra note 10 (“[C]an anyone actually argue with a straight face 
that the track record of the commissions to date justifies the deference and respect at 
the heart of the D.C. Circuit’s decision to abstain?”); Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 139 
(Tatel, J., dissenting) (“The notion that federal courts should delay exercising their 
habeas jurisdiction out of respect for a system of rarely used and temporary 
tribunals strikes me as rather odd.”). 
184 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 123. 
185 Id. at 125. 
186 In fifteen years, the commissions have handed down only eight convictions. 
Vladeck, supra note 10. 
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legitimacy of military commissions derives from joint 
congressional-executive action expressly authorizing their use as 
a tool to fight terrorism; their track record is immaterial.187  To 
consider the commissions’ track record when deciding to abstain, 
and therefore defer, would prove unworkable.  What, precisely, 
would be a track record meriting deference?  Would it be based 
on the number of convictions?  The number of convictions later 
overturned by federal courts?  Or would each commission would 
have to earn respect individually, based on the performance of 
the individual military judge discharging his or her duty?  
Whatever on-the-ground problems the military commissions may 
encounter will be sorted out by them in the first instance, with 
the possibility for federal court review of those issues once a final 
judgment has been issued in the proceeding.188  This is the 
process Congress and the President prescribed, and the process 
that Al-Nashiri II respected. 
The decision to defer in Al-Nashiri II was based on 
principled separation of powers considerations, not a policy 
judgment on the effectiveness of the current system.  The panel 
opted to defer to the military commissions only when there was 
bilateral support from the political branches.  The theoretical 
framework for judicial deference articulated by Professors Pildes, 
Issacharoff, and Sunstein appears best capable of describing the 
court’s separation of powers rationale, then.  With the MCA in 
place, the executive is now convening military commissions 
whose appellate structure and composition was considered, 
crafted, and enacted by Congress.  The Al-Nashiri II court 
accepted that joint executive-legislative judgment.  Additionally, 
the decision has the features of the “minimalist alternative” 
introduced by Professor Sunstein.  Rather than decide 
prematurely the difficult jurisdiction question, the court issued a 
narrow and incompletely theorized decision that will sharpen 
eventual Article III review of the question on appeal. 
 
187 None of this is to suggest that the track record of the current commission 
system should not be a concern for congressional leaders charged with making policy 
decisions on how the nation should bring to justice those who commit crimes likes 
the ones allegedly committed by al-Nashiri. The point here is that the commissions’ 
track record has little bearing on the question of abstention. 
188 See Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130, 137 (D.D.C. 2008) (“If the 
Military Commission judge gets it wrong, his error may be corrected by the CMCR. 
If the CMCR gets it wrong, it may be corrected by the D.C. Circuit. And if the D.C. 
Circuit gets it wrong, the Supreme Court may grant a writ of certiorari.”). 
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It was one thing for federal courts to intervene into the 
ongoing trial of a military commission when it lacked explicit 
congressional authorization;189 it is quite another for federal 
judges to disregard congressional policy decisions regarding the 
timing of federal court review.  By deferring to the joint actions of 
the political branches in an area rife with national security 
concerns—the prosecution and punishment of enemy 
belligerents—the D.C. Circuit appropriately weighed the 
separation of powers considerations underlying abstention 
doctrine.  Because the establishment of military commissions has 
been traditionally within the “pattern of cooperation between the 
President and Congress in war and national security affairs,”190 
and because “in the realm of national security, the expertise of 
the political branches is at its apogee,”191 deference in this 
context furthers sound separation of powers principles.192 
B. The Consequences of Al-Nashiri Abstention for Article III 
Review of Commissions 
The D.C. Circuit’s Al-Nashiri II decision has several 
important consequences.  First, it lends appellate approval to the 
numerous district court decisions that abstained from 
intervening into ongoing military commission proceedings after 
Congress expressly approved of their use.  Second, it permits the 
application of military expertise in deciding complex law of war 
issues, just as Congress intended.  Finally, it allows for more 
informed congressional review of the military commission system 
as a whole. 
Al-Nashiri II lends appellate approval to the growing 
number of district courts that had applied Councilman 
abstention to collateral attacks on ongoing commission 
 
189 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 12, at 44 (noting “[where] the executive has 
acted . . . without legislative approval, the courts have invalidated executive action, 
even during wartime . . . .”). 
190 Ku & Yoo, supra note 18, at 207. 
191 Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d 110, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Hamad v. Gates, 732 
F.3d 990, 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Congress’s decisions with respect to [Guantánamo] 
detainees are at the core of Congress’s authority with respect to ‘the conduct of 
foreign relations [and] the war power.’ ”) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 
n.17 (1976))). 
192 See discussion supra notes 12–17. 
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proceedings in Hamdan’s wake.193  For example, in Khadr v. 
Bush,194 the court found judicial “respect for a congressionally-
authorized military court system that includes independent 
review by civilian judges” warranted abstention.195  Because the 
claims in Khadr’s habeas petition “have been, will be, or, at the 
very least, can be raised in the military commission proceeding 
and the subsequent appeals process,” the court declined to 
intervene.196  In a second habeas petition requesting a federal 
court enjoin Khadr’s ongoing commission proceeding, the court 
again abstained and reiterated the reasoning of the earlier 
decision.197  Perhaps the best indicator that much has changed 
since Hamdan is that in a later habeas petition brought by 
Hamdan himself, the district court found that Councilman’s 
“central rationale is applicable here.”198  The court recognized 
that congressional involvement in the 2006 MCA had changed 
the abstention equation:  “Hamdan is to face a 
military . . . commission designed by a Congress that . . . act[ed] 
according to guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court.”199  In a 
nod to judicial modesty, the court noted, “Article III judges do not 
have a monopoly on justice, or on constitutional learning.”200  
Relatedly, the recent D.C. Circuit decision in Bahlul recognized 
that congressional involvement has fortified military 
commissions from dissection in a federal court.201  In extending 
Councilman abstention to the military commissions under the 
MCA, lower courts have recognized the proper role each branch  
 
 
193 See, e.g., Al-Nashiri v. MacDonald, No. 11-5907 RJB, 2012 WL 1642306, at 
*11 (W.D. Wash. May 10, 2012) (“[U]nder the principles of abstention announced in 
Councilman, the Court should not exercise equitable jurisdiction.”). Indeed, as 
another D.C. Circuit military commission abstention case makes clear, “abstention is 
surely not appropriate where . . . a trial before a military commission is only a 
possibility and only at some unspecified time in the future.” Obaydullah v. Obama, 
609 F.3d 444, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
194 587 F. Supp. 2d 225 (D.D.C. 2008). 
195 Id. at 231. 
196 Id. at 230–31. 
197 Khadr v. Obama, 724 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64–68 (D.D.C. 2010). 
198 Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130, 136 (D.D.C. 2008). 
199 Id. (quoting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 18 (D.D.C. 2006)). 
200 Id. at 137. 
201 See Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Pursuant to 
congressional authorization, Presidents throughout U.S. history have employed 
military commissions to try enemy war criminals for conspiracy to commit war 
crimes.”). 
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of government plays in this context:  Congress creates the 
commissions, the executive conducts them, and the judiciary 
reviews their judgments.202 
By requiring al-Nashiri to follow the MCA’s thorough review 
procedures, rather than allow him to “jump the line” and short-
circuit the carefully designed process, the court ensured that 
military judges will have the opportunity to apply their expertise 
to the complex law of war questions before them.  Al-Nashiri’s 
jurisdictional challenge requires the court to decide when 
hostilities began with al Qaida.  Resolving the extent to which an 
armed conflict existed when al-Nashiri’s actions were committed 
will benefit from the application of military expertise.  The 
question involves “the military nature of violent acts” as well as 
the “military nature of al-Nashiri’s conduct.”203  Of course, a 
federal district court could order discovery on these questions, 
but as was pointed out at oral argument, there is a difference 
between having all the facts and having the expertise to draw 
conclusions from those facts.204  Just because a federal district 
court judge has the same facts in front of her does not mean that 
she has the “singularly relevant” expertise to resolve the fact-
bound jurisdictional question at issue.205  None of this is to 
question the capacity of the federal district courts to resolve 
complicated issues in a wide range of subject matter areas.206  
But when Congress passed the MCA, which delays Article III 
review until the commission has rendered a judgment, and two 
successive administrations opted to prosecute detainees in a 
commission proceeding, the political branches gave responsibility 
to military judges to decide in the first instance questions like 
the one al-Nashiri has raised.  It is unclear what benefit short-
circuiting the military commission’s role in trying al-Nashiri  
 
 
202 Al-Nashiri v. MacDonald, No. 11-5907 RJB, 2012 WL 1642306, at *11 (W.D. 
Wash. May 10, 2012). 
203 Oral Argument at 24:30, Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d 110 (2016), https://www. 
cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings2016.nsf/77A3A67AD3EF915385257F5C006
765E1/$file/15-1023.mp3; Government’s Brief, supra note 1, at *49. 
204 Oral Argument at 25:50, Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d 110 (2016), https:// 
www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings2016.nsf/77A3A67AD3EF915385257F5
C006765E1/$file/15-1023.mp3. 
205 Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 760 (1975). 
206 Indeed, a corollary of this respect is that respect should be given to military 
judges who faithfully discharge their duties as well. Cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557, 587 (2006). 
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would bring, but the drawbacks, such as duplicative 
proceedings207 and needless conflict with policy-makers, are 
readily discernible. 
Further, there is historical support for delaying Article III 
review until the military commission has issued a final 
judgment.  In Ex parte Vallandigham, Ex parte Milligan, and In 
re Yamashita, the military commission had already tried and 
sentenced the defendant before a federal court became 
involved.208  Obviously this was not the case in either Ex parte 
Quirin or Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, but the passage of the MCA 
casts doubt on those cases as precedent for federal court 
intervention. 
Not only did abstention ensure that eventual Article III 
review will be informed by military judge expertise and 
narrowed, it also will ensure that eventual congressional review 
of the military commission system will be informed by the actual, 
rather than hypothesized, proceedings of the commissions.209  If 
the commission convened to try al-Nashiri proves incapable of 
fairly and efficiently deciding his jurisdictional challenge, then 
policy-makers should consider that failure when revising legal 
systems aimed at trying terrorists for war crimes.  If a federal 
court intervenes and bails out the military commission, then the 
commissions’ shortcomings will not come to light.  In this regard, 
abstaining lends legitimacy to the current military commission 
system without insulating them from eventual congressional 
review of their effectiveness. 
CONCLUSION 
As Justice Jackson noted in Johnson v. Eisentrager, “Modern 
American law has come a long way since the time when outbreak 
of war made every enemy national an outlaw, subject to both 
 
207 Peter Margulies, supra note 8. To demonstrate the point, suppose the panel 
decided abstention was improper. Presumably, it would remand the case to the 
district court to conduct a “mini trial” on the question of when an armed conflict 
with al Qaida began. Resolving the issue would be complex, and if the district court 
determined an armed conflict existed—a determination that would surely be 
appealed—the military commission would still have to revisit the issue in its own 
proceeding. Abstention is aimed at avoiding precisely such duplicative proceedings. 
208 Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243 (1863); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 
(1866); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
209 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 35. 
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public and private slaughter, cruelty and plunder.”210  With some 
unfortunate exceptions,211 U.S. military commissions historically 
have exceeded the international norms of their day.212  This truth 
makes the current system’s shortcomings all the more 
unfortunate, and make no mistake, these shortcomings are on 
full display in the prosecution of al-Nashiri.213  But these 
shortcomings are no pretext for judicial immodesty.  When 
Congress and the President act jointly on a matter touching on 
national security, longstanding separation of powers principles 
demand that their judgments receive judicial deference.  Having 
asked, the Supreme Court received express congressional 
authorization of the military commissions, which empowered 
federal courts to review commission decisions at a specific point.  
The Al-Nashiri II court followed the system’s order of operations 
and left policy-making to the nation’s legislature.  Going forward, 
the military commissions will be allowed to proceed 
uninterrupted until they issue a final judgment, provided the 
commission does not suffer from a constitutional defect, just as 
Congress intended.  Thus, as Judge Bryan noted in another al-
Nashiri decision, “While the use of military commissions . . . is 
subject to debate and criticism, their existence is for the people to 
decide through Congress consistent with the Constitution.”214 
 
210 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768–69 (1950). 
211 See Chomsky, supra note 39, at 55. 
212 See David Glazier, The Development of an Exceptional Court: The History of 
the American Military Commission, in GUANTÁNAMO AND BEYOND: EXCEPTIONAL 
COURTS AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 39, 
at 37, 37. 
213 In just one example, al-Nashiri’s counsel estimated in his briefing that his 
trial will not commence until 2018, and further estimated in rebuttal at oral 
argument that appellate review of al-Nashiri’s claims will not occur until 2024; the 
government did not challenge this estimate at oral argument. Al-Nashiri II, 835 
F.3d at 135. The troubles have continued. See Amy Davidson Sorkin, At 
Guantánamo, Are Even the Judges Giving Up?, NEW YORKER (Feb. 20, 2018), https:// 
www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/at-guantanamo-are-even-the-judges-
giving-up. 
214 Al-Nashiri v. MacDonald, No. 11-5907 RJB, 2012 WL 1642306, at *11 (W.D. 
Wash. May 10, 2012). 
